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Decoy-state protocols provide a way to defeat photon-number splitting attacks in quantum cryp-
tography implemented with weak coherent pulses. We point out that previous security analyses
of such protocols relied on assumptions about eavesdropping attacks that considered treating each
pulse equally and independently. We give an example to demonstrate that, without such assump-
tions, the security parameters of previous decoy-state implementations could be worse than the ones
claimed. Next we consider more general photon-number splitting attacks, which correlate different
pulses, and give an estimation procedure for the number of single photon signals with rigorous
security statements. The impact of our result is that previous analyses of the number of times
a decoy-state quantum cryptographic system can be reused before it makes a weak key must be
revised.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Ac, 42.50.-p
I. INTRODUCTION: PHOTON NUMBER
SPLITTING ATTACKS AND DECOY-STATE
PROTOCOLS
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–4] allows two par-
ties, Alice and Bob, to establish a common and secret key
S that is informationally secure; see [5–7] and references
therein. A widely used setup for QKD is the one sug-
gested by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [2]. BB84 is ide-
ally implemented by preparing and transmitting single-
photon pulses. Information can be encoded in the state
of one of two conjugate polarization bases, e.g. verti-
cal/horizontal or diagonal/antidiagonal. Only those pho-
tons that were prepared by Alice and detected by Bob in
the same basis are useful to build a sifted key, which
forms S after additional steps of information reconcilia-
tion and privacy amplification. Security follows from the
inability of faithfully copying quantum information [8]
and the unavoidable information-disturbance trade-off in
quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, realistic implementa-
tions of BB84 use weak coherent photon pulses that could
involve many photons, avoiding the assumptions made in
security analyses [9–11]. Such pulses could be exploited
by Eve, the eavesdropper, to gain access to the (insecure)
distributed key using a so-called photon-number splitting
(PNS) attack [12, 13]. In a simple proposed PNS attack,
Eve measures the number of photons in the pulse, n. If
n = 1, Eve blocks the pulse. If n ≥ 2, Eve “splits” the
pulse to obtain a copy of a single photon with the correct
polarization and keeps it in her quantum memory. Eve
could then obtain a full copy of S by making measure-
ments of her photons in the correct polarization bases,
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which are known after a public discussion between Al-
ice and Bob. Since Alice and Bob cannot measure n, a
PNS attack may go undetected. Our goal is to provide a
protocol for secure QKD in the presence of PNS attacks.
A simple approach to overcome a PNS attack considers
reducing the probability of multi-photon pulses by reduc-
ing the coherent-pulse intensities. The drawback with
this approach is that the probability of creating single-
photon pulses is also reduced. Then, the rate at which
bits to build S are sifted is far from optimal [13, 14].
Another approach is to use decoy states, that allow to
detect PNS attacks without a substantial reduction on
the rate of sifted bits if Eve is not present [15–17]. In a
decoy-state protocol (DSP), one of several weak coherent
sources is randomly selected for each pulse. Such sources
create pulses of different intensities (mean photon num-
bers). This gives Alice and Bob a means to estimate f0
and f1, the number of Bob’s detections due to empty and
single-photon pulses prepared by Alice, in the same basis,
respectively. The values of f0 and f1 are important to
determine |S|, the length of the secure key. For example,
in the discussed PNS attack, f1 is substantially smaller
than its value when Eve is not present, and so is |S|.
In more detail, we let K  1 be the total number
of pulses prepared by Alice. We first assume that the
channel is non-adversarial, i.e. no eavesdropping attacks
are present. If the pulse has a random phase, the number
of photons it contains is sampled according to the Poisson
distribution:
pµn = Pr(n|µ) = e−µ
µn
n!
, (1)
where µ is the mean photon number for that source
and µ ≤ 1 in applications. We let η be the transmis-
sion/detection efficiency of the quantum channel shared
by Alice and Bob. If b = 1 (b = 0) denotes the event
in which Bob detects a non-empty (empty or vacuum)
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2pulse,
yn = Pr(b = 1|n)
is the probability of a detection by Bob given that Alice’s
prepared pulse contained n photons. yn is the so-called
n-photon yield and yn < 1 due to losses in the channel.
For n ≥ 1, we may assume
yn = 1− (1− η)n ,
which is a good approximation in applications. For n =
0, y0 > 0 denotes Bob’s detector dark-count rate. The
total probability of Bob detecting a pulse (in any one
cycle) is the total yield
Y (µ) = Pr(b = 1) (2)
=
∑
n≥0
Pr(n|µ)yn
= e−µy0 + 1− e−µη .
Y (µ) can be estimated by Alice and Bob, via public dis-
cussion, from the frequency of detections after all pulses
were transmitted.
In QKD, we allow Eve to manipulate the parameters
that characterize the channel at her will. We use the su-
perscript E to represent the interaction of Eve with the
communication. For example, yEn denotes the n-photon
yield in the presence of Eve. In a general intercept-resend
attack, Eve may intercept a pulse and resend a different
one. That is, each detection by Bob is not guaranteed
to come from the same pulse that Alice prepared. In a
simple PNS attack, Eve makes non-demolition measure-
ments of n. With this information, Eve sets yE1 = 0 6= y1
and yEn ≥ yn for n ≥ 2, so that
Y (µ) ≈ Y E(µ) .
Then, if Alice and Bob can only estimate the total yields,
a PNS attack could be “invisible” with the right choices
of yE2 , yE3 , . . .. To increase the multi-photon yield, Eve
may use an ideal channel to resend the pulses. (Note
that sophisticated PNS attacks that do not change the
Poisson distribution are possible [13].) A PNS attack
allows Eve to have the full key S if
Pr(n ≥ 2|µ) ≥ Y (µ) .
In this case, Eve possesses a photon with the same po-
larization as that of the pulse detected by Bob and no
single-photon pulses are involved in creating S. Only if
Pr(n ≥ 2|µ) < Y (µ) some security guarantees are pos-
sible [14]. Such an inequality is satisfied when µ ≈ η,
implying a rate for sifted bits of order η2 [Eq. (2)]. This
is undesirably small (η  1).
Remarkably, DSPs give an optimal rate of order η with
small resource overheads. A goal in a DSP is to esti-
mate yE0 and yE1 , which provide a lower bound on fE0 and
fE1 , respectively. Empty and single-photon pulses cannot
be split and the information carried in their polarization
cannot be faithfully copied, making them useful to cre-
ate a secure key. For the estimation, Alice uses photon
sources with different values of µ, but are identical oth-
erwise. In a conventional DSP, it is assumed that Eve’s
PNS attack treats every n-photon pulse equally and inde-
pendently, regardless of its source. That is, Eve’s attack
is simulated by independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables. The total yield in this case is,
for any given µ,
Y E(µ) =
∑
n≥0
pµn y
E
n . (3)
Equation (3) describes mathematically what we denote
as the i.i.d. assumption. It follows that
yE0 = Y
E(µ)|µ=0 ,
yE1 = ∂µ
[
eµY E(µ)
] |µ=0 . (4)
Then, if Eve’s attack satisfies Y (µ) ≈ Y E(µ) for all µ,
yE0 ≈ y0 , yE1 ≈ y1 = η .
That is, by being able to estimate Y E(µ) for two val-
ues of µ  1 via public discussion, Alice and Bob can
restrict Eve’s attack so that the dark-count rate and
single-photon yield are almost unchanged from the non-
adversarial case. In addition, if a third source with µ ≈ 1
is randomly invoked, an optimal key rate of order η will
be achieved.
In reality, the estimation of yE0 and yE1 is subject to
finite statistics and can be technically involved. Nev-
ertheless, the i.i.d. assumption in Eq. (3) allows Alice
and Bob to gain information about Eve’s attack by run-
ning the protocol and analyzing the (binomial) distribu-
tions of the detection events for each source. However,
we remark that if Eve were to correlate her attacks, the
i.i.d. assumption and the corresponding security analy-
ses would be invalid. This is the main motivation behind
our analysis.
In this paper, we give an example that shows how the
i.i.d. assumption can be simply bypassed by Eve, re-
sulting in security parameters that are worse from those
obtained under the assumption. We then analyze the se-
curity of DSPs for general PNS attacks. Our main result
is an estimation procedure that gives a lower bound on
fE0 and fE1 , with a confidence level that is an input to the
estimation procedure. Our security analysis does not use
the i.i.d. assumption and is particularly relevant when
Eve performs a PNS attack that could correlate different
pulses in one session or even different sessions. We com-
pare some results obtained by our estimation procedure
with those obtained by using the i.i.d. assumption, and
emphasize the important of our procedure.
3II. THE SECURITY PARAMETER, THE I.I.D.
ASSUMPTION, AND FINITE STATISTICS
Of high significance in cryptographic protocols is , the
so-called security parameter.  measures the deviation of
a real protocol implementation from an ideal one. We
use the same definition used in Ref. [7], that states that
a real QKD protocol is -secure if it is -indistinguishable
from a perfectly secure and ideal one. This definition
is equivalent to a statement on the trace norm of the
difference between the quantum states resulting from the
real and ideal protocol, respectively. It implies that a
QKD protocol that is -secure can be safely reused order
1/ times without compromising its security.
Usually, one fixes a value for  and then determines the
size of S based on several protocol performance parame-
ters. These parameters include the number of pulses sent
by Alice, the number of pulses detected by Bob, and the
estimated bit error rates at each mean photon number.
For DSPs,  has a component DSP that determines the
confidence level in the estimation of a lower bound of fE0
and fE1 , due to finite statistics.
A possible way to obtain such lower bounds, under the
i.i.d. assumption, is the one followed in Ref [17]. In this
case, we consider a DSP with three sources, i = U, V,W .
The mean photon number in each pulse, for each source,
is µU = 0, µV  1, and µW ∈ O(1). Each source i
randomly prepares a pulse with probability qi and we let
Ki be the total number of pulses for that source. Ki
is known to Alice and Bob by public discussion after all
pulses are sent and Ki ≈ qiK when K  1. We write
Di,E for the random variable that counts the number of
pulses from source i detected by Bob under the presence
of Eve [18]. The exact value that Di,E takes in a ses-
sion can also be obtained by Alice and Bob via public
discussion after the pulses were transmitted.
Under the i.i.d. assumption [Eq. (3)], Di,E is sampled
according to the binomial distribution. Then, Di,E/Ki
is an estimator of the total yield Y E(µi) = E[Di,E/Ki],
where E[.] denotes the mean value. That is, for a given
¯DSP, we can establish confidence intervals
Di,E
Ki
+ c(¯DSP)σ
i,E ≥ Y E(µi) ≥ D
i,E
Ki
− c(¯DSP)σi,E ,
(5)
with confidence level 1 − ¯DSP. The constant c depends
on ¯DSP and can be obtained using Chernoff’s bound [19]
– see Appendix B. The standard deviation in this case is
σi,E ≈
√
Y E(µi)(1− Y E(µi))
qiK
. (6)
Using Eq. (3) for Y E(µi), we can search for the minimum
values of yE0 and yE1 that satisfy Eqs. (5), e.g. by execut-
ing a linear program. Both yE0 and yE1 can then be used
to obtain the desired lower bounds on fE0 and fE1 , respec-
tively, with corresponding confidence level 1−DSP. This
last step also requires using the i.i.d. assumption.
We remark that Eq. (5) does not properly regard the
problem of inferring a distribution for Y E(µi) from the
known D
i,E
Ki , a problem that would require knowledge on
the prior distribution of Y E(µi).
III. INCREASING THE LENGTH OF
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS: AN ATTACK
The analysis in Sec. II used the i.i.d. assumption that
resulted in a value for σi,E given by Eq. (6). Nevertheless,
the actual value of σi,E could be much higher in more
general PNS attacks. For the same confidence level, a
bigger σi,E implies a “wider” confidence interval for the
estimation of the yield Y E(µi) (Appendix B), and thus
smaller lower bounds on fE0 and fE1 . The overall result
in the DSP is a secret key S of smaller size for the same
security parameter.
To illustrate how Eve can bypass the i.i.d. assumption,
we suggest a potential attack that results in almost no
change for the total yields (i.e., Y (µi) ≈ Y E(µi)) [20] but
the variances σi,E are increased with respect to those of
the binomial distribution [Eq. (6)]. The suggested attack
could be detected by Alice and Bob by estimating the
variances directly via public discussion. Nevertheless, it
still shows that a better analysis of the security of DSPs
is needed to make rigorous claims.
In the attack, Eve first picks an integer value for τ ≥ 1,
where τ2 denotes a scale for a variance or “correlation”
of a particular distribution. Eve receives all pulses from
Alice and we let kn be the total number of n-photon
pulses in the protocol. Note that the exact value of kn is
known to Eve but not to Alice and Bob. In general, kn
is sampled according to the binomial distribution
Pr(kn) =
(
K
kn
)
(pn)
kn(1− pn)K−kn ,
where pn is the probability of a pulse containing n pho-
tons: pn =
∑
i q
ipµ
i
n . The mean and variance for such
distribution are
E[kn] = pnK ,
σ2kn = pn(1− pn)K .
Given kn, Eve randomly picks a value for dEn ∈
{0, 1 . . . , kn}, where dEn =
∑
i d
i,E
n is the total number
of detections due to n-photon pulses prepared by Alice.
In particular, we assume that Eve can control dE0 , which
determines the dark-count rate. The distribution associ-
ated with dEn has the following properties:
E[dEn|kn] = ynkn , (7)
σ2dEn|kn = τ
2yn(1− yn)kn .
We let di,En be the number of n-photon pulses, prepared
by Alice’s ith source only, and detected by Bob. The
exact value of di,En is unknown to all parties. Because
4Eve does not know the source being used in the DSP,
di,En is sampled according to the binomial distribution
when given dEn:
Pr(di,En |dEn) =
(
dEn
di,En
)
(qin)
di,En (1− qin)d
E
n−di,En , (8)
where
qin =
qie−µ
i
(µi)n∑
i′=U,V,W q
i′e−µi
′
(µi′)n
. (9)
The distribution associated with di,En satisfies
E[di,En |dEn] = qindEn ,
σ2
di,En |dEn
= qin(1− qin)qEn .
As in Sec. II, we let (σi,E)2 be the variance associated
with the random variable Zi,E = Di,E/Ki, where
Di,E =
∑
n≥0
di,En , (10)
and E[Zi,E ] = Y E(µi). An accurate estimate of Zi,E
can be obtained if we approximate Ki ≈ qiK, in the
limit of large K. In addition, because K is fixed, the
variables kn are not independent. However, in the large-
K limit, kn can also be approximated by its mean value.
It implies that the kn are almost independent and so are
the dEn and di,En for different values of n. Under these
approximations,
(σi,E)2 ≈ 1
(qiK)2
∑
n≥0
σ2
di,En
. (11)
In Appendix A we show that
σ2
di,En
= [(τ2 − 1)qin(1− yn) + (1− qinynpn)]qinynpnK .
(12)
By inserting Eq. (12) in Eq. (11), we can obtain the vari-
ances as a function of τ . In Fig. 1 we compute σU,E and
σV,E . The i.i.d. assumption discussed in Sec. II corre-
sponds to τ = 1 – see Appendix A. Using these results
in Eq. (5) yields wider confidence intervals for the same
confidence level.
To illustrate our point further, we consider a simple
attack in which a single source U is used to estimate the
dark-count rate. Here, µU = 0 and dE0 = DU,E is known.
In the non-adversarial case, dE0 is sampled according to
the binomial distribution with probability y0 and known
sample size k0 = KU . Nevertheless, for the correlated
attack, we assume that Eve “receives” the KU pulses and
groups them according to blocks of size τ2. Then, Eve
will force (prevent) the detection of all pulses in any one
block with probability y0 (1− y0). The random variable
dE0 for the correlated attack satisfies
E[dE0 ] = y0k0 ,
σ2dE0
(τ) = [y0(τ
2)2 − (y0τ2)2]k0
τ2
= τ2y0(1− y0)k0 ,
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FIG. 1. The standard deviations σU,E and σV,E for an attack
in which Eve correlates n-photon pulses according to the value
of τ . The channel parameters are 1 ≤ τ ≤ 100, K = 1010,
qU = 0.01, qV = 0.0275, µU = 0, µV = 0.063, η = 10−3,
and y0 = 2.10−6 [17]. The results in Sec. II are recovered for
τ = 1.
and τ = 1 corresponds again to the i.i.d. assumption [see
Eq. (7)].
In Fig. 2 (A), we plot the probability that ZU,E =
DU,E/KU satisfies
E[ZU,E ] + cσdE0 (1) ≥ Z
U,E ≥ E[ZU,E ]− cσdE0 (1) ,
for different values of c and τ . For τ = 1, such a prob-
ability corresponds to the confidence level in Eq. (5).
E[ZU,E ] = y0 in this example. For the inverse problem,
namely the estimation of y0 from DU,E and KU , Eq. (5)
may be incorrect. We may then assume a uniform prior
distribution for y0 ∈ [0, 1], and obtain the posterior dis-
tribution as
Pr(y0|DU,E) = Pr(DU,E |y0)Pr(y0)/Pr(DU,E) (13)
∝
(
KU/τ2
DU,E/τ2
)
y
DU,E/τ2
0 (1− y0)(K
U−DU,E)/τ2 ,
which is plotted in Fig. 2 (B). Our results demonstrate
that, for a fixed security parameter, the accuracy in the
estimation of the dark-count rate strongly depends on
Eve’s attack and can be substantially different from the
one obtained under the i.i.d. assumption (τ = 1).
IV. SECURITY OF DSP: CORRELATED PNS
ATTACKS
We go beyond the i.i.d. assumption and study more
general and correlated PNS attacks, in which Eve has full
control on Bob’s detection events. The secure key-rate
in a realistic implementation of QKD is [17]
s ≥ fE∗0 + fE∗1 − κECF EH2(BER)− κPAfE∗1 H2(bmax1 ) ,
(14)
which determines the size of the distributed key as |S| =
sK. F E is the total number of pulses detected by Bob
and prepared by Alice in the same basis, that are useful
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FIG. 2. Estimation of dark counts. (A) Confidence intervals
for different correlated attacks, parametrized by τ , and confi-
dence bounds, parametrized by c. (B) Bayesian estimation of
y0, the mean dark-count rate, assuming a uniform prior and
for different correlated attacks [Eq. (13)].
for the sifted key. In BB84, F E ≈ DE/2, where DE is the
total number of detections. fE∗n is a lower bound on fEn ,
the number of n-photon pulses prepared and detected
in the same basis. H2(.) is the Shannon entropy, κEC
and κPA are coefficients due to the error correction and
privacy amplification steps, BER is the total bit error
rate, and bmax1 is an upper bound to the bit error rate
due to single-photon pulses only.
In a DSP, we characterize a general PNS attack by the
distribution
Pr(dE0 , d
E
1 , . . . |k0, k1, . . .) ; (15)
See Fig. 3 for an example. Our goal is to build an es-
timation procedure that places confidence intervals on
fE0 =
∑
i f
i,E
0 and f
E
1 =
∑
i f
i,E
1 from the known D
i,E .
These intervals ultimately imply a lower bound on s –
see Eq. (14).
We assume that there are three sources satisfying
µU = 0 < µV < µW , and µW ∈ O(1). Neverthe-
less, our analysis can be easily generalized to the case in
which more sources are present, where the estimation is
more accurate. For each source, Bob’s detections satisfy
Eq. (10). If a simple relationship between each di,En and
dEn could be found, we could execute a program to solve
Eqs. (10). Such a relationship could be obtained from the
binomial distribution associated with di,En , when given dEn
[Eq. (8)].
Our estimation procedure uses di,En to determine the
confidence intervals
Φi,n(d
i,E
n ) ≥ dEn ≥ φi,n(di,En ) . (16)
A"ack 
Known to Alice‐Bob, unknown to Eve 
Known to Eve, 
unknown to Alice‐Bob 
Known to Alice‐Bob, unknown to Eve 
… 
empty  empty  … 
FIG. 3. A general PNS attack with three decoy sources,
µU = 0, µV  1, and µW ∈ O(1). Each block represents
the number of pulses with n = 0, 1, 2, . . ., respectively. The
random variables kn indicate the number of n-photon pulses
prepared by Alice and the superscript i denotes the source
used for such pulses. Eve’s attack controls the number of
detections by Bob, due to n-photon pulses, through dEn.
The corresponding confidence level for each inequality is
1 − n/2. The upper and lower bounds are monotonic
and invertible functions. Then,
φ−1i,n(d
E
n) ≥ di,En ≥ Φ−1i,n(dEn) , (17)
with the same confidence levels. Such confidence levels
do not result from the binomial distribution as we are
analyzing the inverse problem, namely the estimation of
dEn from the available information (i.e., Di,E and Ki).
From Eqs. (10) and (17), we obtain∑
n≥0
φ−1i,n(d
E
n) ≥ Di,E ≥
∑
n≥0
Φ−1i,n(d
E
n) ; (18)
See Fig. 4 for an example.
Next, our estimation procedure executes a program to
obtain dE∗0 and dE∗1 , the corresponding smallest values of
dE0 and dE1 , subject to the constraints given by Eqs. (18).
From the union bound, the confidence level in such values
is 1− ¯DSP, with
¯DSP ≤ 3
∑
n≥0
n , (19)
when three sources are used. Since fE∗0 and fE∗1 are sam-
pled according to a binomial distribution when given F E
(i.e., the preparation and detection basis are random),
we obtain
fE∗n = F
E d
E∗
n
DE
− c(δ¯DSP)
√
F E
dE∗n
DE
(
1− d
E∗
n
DE
)
, (20)
where the constant c(δ¯DSP) ≥ 0 can be obtained using
Eq. (B3). The overall confidence level for the key rate s
6dV,E0 d
V,E
1
dE0 d
E
1
Φ−1V,1(d
E
1 )Φ
−1
V,0(d
E
0 )
φ−1V,0(d
E
0 ) φ
−1
V,1(d
E
1 )
Pr ≥ 1− (￿0 + ￿1)
FIG. 4. Upper and lower bounds on dV,E0 + d
V,E
1 ≈ dV,E . The
yellow blocks represent the number of pulses from source V
with n = 0 and n = 1. The dark and blue blocks represent
the total number of pulses with n = 0 and n = 1, respectively.
The confidence level for this case is not smaller than 1− (0+
1).
is 1− DSP, where the security parameter satisfies
DSP ≤ ¯DSP + δ¯DSP . (21)
In the next section we obtain the confidence intervals and
levels specifically for our method.
Confidence intervals for the estimation procedure
Our method takes DSP as input and outputs fE∗0 and
fE∗1 . To satisfy Eq. (21), we can set
c(δ¯DSP) = 2
√
| log(DSP/2)| (22)
and
n = (DSP/12)(1/2)
n (23)
[see Eqs. (B3) and (C1)]. Next, we will find dE∗0 and dE∗1
as required by Eq. (20).
If φ depends on di,En only, the probability that dEn is
smaller than φ is
K∑
dEn=0
Pr(dEn)
∑
dEn≥di,En >uin
Pr(di,En |dEn) =
n
2
, (24)
with
uin = φ
−1
i,n(d
E
n) .
When given dEn, the random variable di,En is sampled ac-
cording to Eq. (8). From Chernoff’s bound (Appendix B)
n≤ 2 max
0≤dEn≤K
exp
{
− (u
i
n − qindEn)2
4qin(1− qin)dEn
}
, (25)
and we choose the lower bound so that
φi,n(d
i,E
n ) =
di,En
qin
− cn 1− q
i
n
2qin
√c2n + 4di,En(1− qin)2 − cn
 ,
(26)
with cn ≥ 0. The error probability satisfies
n ≤ 2 exp
{−c2n/4} ; (27)
See Appendix C. A similar analysis gives the upper
bound
Φi,n(d
i,E
n ) =
di,En
qin
+ cn
1− qin
2qin
√c2n + 4di,En(1− qin)2 + cn
 ,
(28)
with the same confidence level. Then, to satisfy Eq. (23),
it suffices to set
c2n(DSP) = 4| log(DSP/24) + n log(1/2)| .
To complete the estimation procedure, we invert
Eqs. (26) and (28) and obtain∑
n≥0
qind
E
n + cn(DSP)
√
qin(1− qin)dEn ≥ Di,E , (29)
Di,E ≥
∑
n≥0
qind
E
n − cn(DSP)
√
qin(1− qin)dEn .
We can then execute a program that finds the minimum
values of dE0 and dE1 subject to Eqs. (29). For instance, a
quadratic program can be used to search
√
qind
E∗
n . Such
minimum values will be used in Eqs. (20) and (14) to
obtain the key rate.
A technical remark is in order. When n → ∞,
qin(1− qin)→ 0 exponentially fast in n. Then, the contri-
bution of large-n terms in Eqs. (29) is negligible. We can
set a suitable cutoff nmax ≥ n in the number of photons
per pulse in our analysis, to avoid unnecessary compu-
tational overheads in finding dE∗0 and dE∗1 , and with an
insignificant impact in the estimated values.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed general photon-number splitting attacks
and pointed out that previous security analyses on decoy-
state protocols for QKDmade a strong assumption on the
attack. We provided an estimation procedure that sets
a lower bound on the size of the secure, distributed key,
with the corresponding confidence levels. Our procedure
7requires executing a program to find the minimum values
of the number of detections due to empty and single-
photon pulses, subject to constraints that are determined
by the results of the protocol and by the desired security
parameter. It results in rigorous security guarantees even
if Eve correlates her attack according to the number of
photons in the pulse.
We emphasize that our estimation procedure is not
unique: Any time that a confidence interval can be set
as a function of publicly available information for gen-
eral attacks, then an estimation procedure is possible. In
addition, our choice of confidence intervals and n is not
essential and could be further optimized to improve the
size of the secure key.
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Appendix A: Properties of ZEi
We let X ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K} be a random variable
and f(X) the probability distribution. The random
variable Y ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K} has the conditional dis-
tribution g(Y |X). The probability of Y is h(Y ) =∑K
X=0 g(Y |X)f(X). Then, it is easy to show
σ2Y = E[σ
2
Y |X ] + σ
2
E[Y |X] , (A1)
where
σ2Y =
K∑
Y=0
h(Y )Y 2 −
(
K∑
Y=0
h(Y )Y
)2
is the variance of Y . Also,
E[Y |X] =
K∑
Y=0
g(Y |X)Y
is the expected value of Y when given X,
σ2E[Y |X] =
K∑
X=0
f(X)E[Y |X]−
(
K∑
X=0
f(X)E[Y |X]
)2
is the variance of E[Y |X],
σ2Y |X =
K∑
Y=0
g(Y |X)Y 2 −
(
K∑
Y=0
g(Y |X)Y
)2
is the variance of Y when given X, and
E[σ2Y |X ] =
K∑
X=0
f(X)σ2Y |X
is the expected value of such a variance.
In the attack discussed in Sec. III, K is fixed and the
distribution of kn satisfies
E[kn] = pnK ,
σ2kn = pn(1− pn)K .
Next, dEn is chosen such that, when given kn,
E[dEn|kn] = ynkn ,
σ2dEn|kn = τ
2yn(1− yn)kn .
It follows that
E[σ2dEn|kn ] = τ
2yn(1− yn)pnK ,
σ2E[dEn|kn] = (yn)
2σ2kn = (yn)
2pn(1− pn)K .
Then,
σ2dEn = τ
2yn(1− yn)pnK + (yn)2pn(1− pn)K .
When given dEn, the distribution for di,En satisfies
E[di,En |dEn] = qindEn ,
σ2
di,En |dEn
= qin(1− qin)dEn .
Therefore,
σ2
E[di,En |dEn]
= (qin)
2σ2dEn ,
E[σ2
di,En |dEn
] = qin(1− qin)ynpnK .
Also,
σ2
di,En
= (qin)
2σ2dEn + q
i
n(1− qin)ynpnK
= (qin)
2[τ2yn(1− yn)pnK + (yn)2pn(1− pn)K]+
+ qin(1− qin)ynpnK
= [(τ2 − 1)qin(1− yn) + (1− qinynpn)]qinynpnK .
The first term on the rhs vanishes when τ = 1. The
second term is
(1− qinynpn)qinynpnK = (1− qiynpµ
i
n )q
iynp
µi
n K ,
so that∑
n≥0
σ2
di,En
= qiY (µi)K − (qi)2K
∑
n≥0
[ynp
µi
n ]
2 ,
for τ = 1. Moreover, since
∑
n≥0[ynp
µi
n ]
2  Y (µi)  1,
then ∑
n≥0
σ2
di,En
≈ qiY (µi)(1− Y (µi))K ,
which shows that the case discussed in Sec. II, i.e. the
i.i.d. assumption, corresponds to choosing τ = 1 in this
case.
8Appendix B: Chernoff bound
Chernoff’s bound [19] sets a bound on the probabilities
of “rare” events as a function of the standard deviation
of the corresponding distribution. More precisely, we let
X1, X2, . . . , Xn be a set of i.i.d. random variables that
satisfy |Xj | ≤ 1 and define X =
∑
j Xj . A general ver-
sion of Chernoff’s bound implies
Pr[X > E[X] + cσ] ≤ exp{−c2/4} , (B1)
where σ = n1/2
√
E[(Xj)2]− (E[Xj ])2 is the standard de-
viation. For the special case of the binomial distribution
where Xj = 1 with probability a and Xj = 0 otherwise,
σ =
√
na(1− a) ,
E[X] = na ,
and
Pr[X > k] = Ia(k, n− k + 1)
≤ exp{−(k − na)2/(4a(1− a)n)} . (B2)
Here, Ia(k, n− k + 1) is the so-called regularized incom-
plete beta function. To satisfy Pr[X > k] ≤ , it suffices
to choose c such that
|c| = 2
√
| log | . (B3)
Appendix C: Calculations of errors
If n ≤ (/12)(1/2)n, then
¯ =
∑
i
∑
n
n (C1)
≤ 3(/12).2 = /2 ,
where we considered that three sources i are involved in
the DSP.
Chernoff’s bound for the binomial distribution
[Eq. (B2)] implies that
n ≤ 2 exp
{
− (u
i
n − qindEn)2
4qin(1− qin)dEn
}
.
If we set,
uin = φ
−1
i,n(d
E
n) = q
i
nd
E
n + cn
√
qin(1− qin)dEn , (C2)
then
n ≤ 2 exp{−c2n/4} ,
as in Eq. (27). Replacing uin by di,En and dEn by φi,n(di,En )
in Eq. (C2), and solving the resulting quadratic equation,
we obtain√
φi,n(d
i,E
n ) =
[
−cn
√
qin(1− qin)+
+
√
c2nq
i
n(1− qin) + 4qindi,En
]
/(2qin) .
That is,
φi,n(d
i,E
n ) =
di,En
qin
+
c2n(1− qin)
2qin
−
−
cn
√
c2n(1− qin)[(1− qin) + 4di,En ]
2qin
,
that yields Eq. (26). Changing cn → −cn provides the
upper bound without changing n, i.e., the confidence
level.
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